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person who so conspires to commit an offense which is punishable by
death shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony."
9 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-256 stipulates that conspiracy to commit
any offense defined in Chapter 7, Article 1, which includes § 18.2-248,
is punishable to no greater extent than the maximum punishment pre-
scribed for the offense. The maximum foraviolation of § 18.2-248 is life
imprisonment. See supra Statutory Structure.
10 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18 (1991). Murder for hire is excepted
from the rule.
I1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(2) (1991) stipulates that, "the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another for hire,"
is capital murder. Section 18.2-18 allows hirors to be charged with and
convicted of capital murder.
12 1990 Journals of the Senate of Virginia 1069 (1990).
13 1990 Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth
of Virginia 1635 (1990).
14d. at 1965-66.
OPPOSING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES UNDER BATSON
BY: MARCUS E. GARCIA AND JAMES W. MILLER JR.
Introduction
Since the ratification of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1868, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed purposeful racial discrimination in the selection ofjurors. For
example, in Strauder v. West Virginia,l the Court invalidated a state
statute which mandated that only white men could serve as jurors. More
recently, the Court stated, "[t]he Constitution requires ... that we look
beyond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and also
consider challenged selection practices to afford 'protection against
action of the State through its administrative officers in effecting the
prohibited discrimination." 2 In Siwain v. Alabama,3 the Court held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment could be
violated if the State's exercise of peremptory challenges excluded
members of the defendant's race.
In Swain, "[t]he Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's
historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control and
the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service
on account of race."4 "To preserve the peremptory nature of the
prosecutor's challenge, the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his
actions in a particular case by relying on a presumption that he properly
exercised the State's challenges."'5 To overcome this presumption, the
Court held that a defendant could construct aprima facie case by showing
"evidence that a prosecutor 'in case after case, whatever the circum-
stances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may
be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as
qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit
juries."' 6 Although the prosecutor in Swain used peremptory challenges
to strike all six eligible blacks on the jury venire, resulting in an all white
jury, the Court held that the defendant "offered no proof of the circum-
stances under which prosecutors were responsible for striking black
jurors beyond the facts of his own case."
'7
In Batson v. Kentuckys the Court reaffirmed that purposeful
discrimination based on race in the selection ofjurors violates the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, the Court stated, "prosecutors' peremp-
tory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny"
due to the "evidentiary formulation" under Swain which "reasoned that
proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary
to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 9 Therefore, the
Court held, "a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful
racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the
facts concerning its selection in his case." 0 The Court stated that the
defendant
first must show that he is a member of cognizable
racial group ... and that the prosecutorhas exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race. Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which
there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute ajury selection practice that permits 'those
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts
and any other relevant circumstances raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used thatpractice to exclude
the veniremen from the petitjury on account of their
race. This combination of factors in the empaneling
of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful dis-
crimination. I I
In evaluating the defendant's case, "the trial court should consider all
relevant circumstances" such as a"pattem of strikes" or"the prosecutor's
questions or statements during voir dire and in exercising his chal-
lenges."12
Once the trial judge determines that the defendant has made a
prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the prosecutor to
"articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried." 13 The Court stated that the prosecutor cannot rebut the defendant's
prima facie case "by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgement-that they
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race," nor
"merely by denying that he had discriminatory motive" or that he acted
in good faith.14 "[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges."' 15 But, the Court stated, "the prosecutor's explanation need
not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause."'t 6 Once
the prosecutor articulates a neutral reason for a disputed peremptory
challenge, the trial court judge then must determine whether or not the
peremptory challenge was discriminatory.
The trial court's determination "is a finding of fact" which "a
reviewing court ordinarily should give... great deference."' 17 The Court
also stated, "[i]n light of the variety ofjury selection practices followed
in our state and federal courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts
how best to implement our holding" and, as to remedies, it stated, "we
express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case.
.. for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a
panel not previously associated with the case or to disallow the discrimi-
natory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged
jurors reinstated on the venire."Is Thus, the Court gave trial judges wide
latitude in the application of the Batson rule to find purposeful discrimi-
nation in peremptory challenges.
It is also important that theBatson Court noted that purposeful
discrimination in the selection ofjurors not only deprives the defendant
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of his sixth amendment right to a fair and impartialjury and his fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection of the laws, but also "unconstitu-
tionally discriminate[s] against the juror," and "undermine[s] public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."'19 In this context, in
Holland v. Illinois,20 where a white defendant objected to theprosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to strike two jurors from the venire who
were black, the Court held that the white defendant had standing to assert
a sixth amendment claim for a venire comprised of a fair cross section of
the community. Although the Court held that the constitutional guaran-
tee to a fair and impartial jury would be undermined if the defendant were
allowed to assert this claim to peremptory challenges in the choosing of
thepetit jury, the Court stated that a defendant who was not the same race
as jurors who were peremptorily struck based upon race could have
standing for a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim because "a
juror dismissed because of race .. .possess[es] little incentive or
resources to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his
own rights."'21 In Powers v. Ohio,22 where a white defendant objected to
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike seven blackjurors
from the venire, the Court affirmed the point made in Holland and held,
"race is irrelevant to a defendant's standing to object to the discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges." Such a defendant can assert third-
party standing as a juror because
"the litigant.., suffered an 'injury in fact,' thus giving him or
her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue
in dispute; the litigant [] [has] a close relation to the third party;
and there [] exist[s] some hinderance to the third party's ability
to protect his or her own interest.
'23
In reaching this conclusion, the Court again gave the trial courts much
deference on how to implement this holding.
I. Batson in Virginia and the Fourth Circuit
A. Race Neutral Reasons
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court stated more about
what the prosecution's reasons for using peremptory strikes to regularly
remove members of a cognizable racial group could not be than what they
could be. The Court held that the prosecution cannot state as a reason that
ajuror of the same race as the defendant would be prejudiced in favor of
the defendant.24 Nor can the prosecution simply reaffirm that race did
not come into play in using peremptory strikes.25 Therefore, courts
following Batson have been left with only a negative definition of what
are proper reasons with which the prosecution may rebut a defendant's
prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Absent a showing
that the prosecution's reasons meet one of the negativeBatson standards,
the courts surveyed in this article have generally allowed any reason the
prosecution may choose to offer as sufficient under Batson.
A survey of cases from the Virginia Supreme Court, the
Virginia Courts of Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has revealed that almost any reason, so long as it is clearly
stated, will be found to meet the Batson
standard.
1. Unemployment
In United States v. Harrell,26 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit clearly stated its position that the prosecu-
tion may provide a juror's unemployment as a reason for peremptorily
striking that juror.27 In Harrell, the defendant, who was black, had been
convicted of armed robbery of a bank. The defendant made a prima facie
showing that the prosecution had used its peremptory strikes to remove
blacks from the jury. In response, the prosecution stated its reason for
striking the black jurors which the defendant challenged was to keep
unemployed persons off thejury in this case. As this was a bank robbery
case, the prosecution wanted jurors who were "interested in a safe bank
account." 28 The Fourth Circuit approved the prosecution's reasoning




Also in Harrell, the Fourth Circuit stated that a juror's lack of
secondary education is a valid reason for the prosecution to peremptorily
strike that juror under Batson.30 The court noted both the prosecution's
stated effort to maintain an "educated"jury and the prosecution's success
in doing so.3 1 The United States Supreme Court later accepted a lack of
high school education as a valid reason for the prosecution to strike a
prospective juror where the defendant was being tried for theft of
personal property.
32
Recently, a lack of education has been held to be an acceptable
reason for a peremptory strike under Batson in opinions by both the
Virginia Supreme Court and Virginia Court of Appeals. The Virginia
Supreme Court accepted the prosecution's efforts in a capital murder
case (murder for hire) to peremptorily strike prospective jurors with
lower levels of education as part of a process of elimination based on an
inadequate education level. 33 In a capital murder case (murder in the
commission of a rape), the Court accepted a less specific educational
reason that "the venireman was lacking in knowledge of matters that
would make her a competent juror. '34 Similarly, in a case involving
drug-related offenses, a Virginia Court of Appeals accepted the
Commonwealth's attorney's reason that a juror's low education level
might limit the juror's ability to serve satisfactorily as jurors.
35
3. Association with the Defendant
Ajuror's direct association with the defendant could prejudice
the prosecution. Therefore, where the defendant in a mail fraud case was
also an elected city official, under a Batson challenge the Fourth Circuit
allowed the prosecution to peremptorily strike a prospective juror who
could have been one of the defendant's constituents. 36 Likewise, in a
case where the defendant was a United States Congressman, the
prosecution's peremptory strike of a prospective juror survived a Batson
challenge because the prospective juror lived in the Congressman's
home district.
37
Sometimes, the juror's association with the defendant may
appear more tenuous and yet survive a Batson challenge. In two cases,
the Fourth Circuit accepted the prosecution's reason that the prospective
juror looked like the defendant.38 In one of those cases, the prosecution
peremptorily struck other prospective jurors for such acceptable reasons
as having been seen talking to one of the defendant's associates, having
a name which sounded like a government witness' name, and having
been employed in an area where the defendant's drug business was
known to operate.
39
In Virginia, that a prospective juror knows the defendant was
a sufficient reason to peremptorily strike the juror in a drug-related
criminal case.40 Like the Fourth Circuit, Virginia does not require such
a direct association. In a first degree murder case, a Virginia Court of
Appeals accepted as reasons for peremptorily striking several prospec-
tive jurors the fact that they lived near the defendant's family, lived near
where the defendant was arrested and were the same age as the defen-
dant.
4 1
4. Association with the Criminal Justice System
Like a jury member who is associated with the defendant, a
jury member with a criminal record may also be prejudiced against the
prosecution. That the Fourth Circuit has accepted a criminal record as the
prosecution's reason for peremptorily striking ajurorunderBatson is not
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surprising. 42 The Virginia Supreme Court has found a prospective
juror's criminal record as an acceptable peremptory strike underBatson
as well.
43
What may be surprising is that seemingly remote associations
with the criminal justice system are sufficient reasons under Batson as
well. In a drug-related criminal case, the Fourth Circuit has accepted the
fact that a prospective juror was employed at the same place as two
government witnesses as a proper reason for the prosecution to exercise
a peremptory strike.44 In a case before a Virginia Court of Appeals, that
a prospective juror lived in a "high crime area" was an acceptable reason
for a peremptory strike.45 Very recently, that a prospective juror simply
looked familiarto a careerdetective working on the case was sufficient.
46
5. Demeanor/Attentiveness
While the prosecution may not want its jurors to have any prior
association with the criminal justice system, it may require them to
exhibit a level of respect for the criminal justice system. The Fourth
Circuit allowed the prosecution in a bank robbery case to peremptorily
strike two prospective jurors for the reason that they chatted excessively
during jury selection and expressed disdain and boredom with the
process.47 In a RICO case in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, that an elderly prospective juror seemed
inattentive was also sufficient under Batson.
48
A juror's lack of attentiveness is a sufficient reason for a
peremptory strike in Virginia as well. In a capital murder trial, that an
elderly juror might become inattentive during "the stress of trial" was a
sufficient Batson reason for the Commonwealth's attorney to perempto-
rily strike him. 49 Furthermore, in Virginia, the Commonwealth's attor-
ney may base her opinion as to the juror's respect for the criminal justice
system upon the juror's appearance. In a case where the defendant was
charged with first degree murder, the Commonwealth's attorney was
allowed to strike one prospective juror because the juror came to the jury
"dressed as if he were going to work in the shipyard," and another
because the juror's "personal appearance concerned" the
Commonwealth's attorney. 50
6. Predisposition
Finally, in Virginia, a prospective juror's predisposition against
the death penalty, although not rising to the level of cause, may be a
sufficient reason for the Commonwealth's attorney to exercise a peremp-
tory strike. In a case where the defendant was charged with capital
murder in the commission of a rape, that the juror gave what the
Commonwealth's attorney believed to be inconsistent responses regard-
ing the juror's ability to impose the death penalty was a sufficient reason
for a peremptory strike.
51
B. Insufficient Reasons and Resulting Remedies
Apparently, the only reason which is insufficient is no reason
at all. However, the remedy is a new trial when a court does find on
appeal that the prosecution has not rebutted a defendant's prima facie
case under Batson. A survey of all cases citing Batson in Virginia and
the Fourth Circuit revealed only two cases in which the court found that,
in response to a Batson challenge, the prosecution's stated reasons for
peremptorily striking the jurors in question were insufficient.
In United States v. Cunningham,52 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held that the prosecution
failed to rebut the defendant's prima facie case underBatson and granted
a new trial. 53 In response to the defendant's Batson challenge, the
prosecution in Cunningham stated that, after the passage of over two
years between the trial, appeal and the present trial on remand, he could
not recall what led him to excuse the jurors in question.54 The court held
that the prosecution's memory loss was no excuse for not articulating
clear reasons as to why he peremptorily struck the Batson juror.55
Although the defendant had served his entire sentence, and the evidence
against him had been overwhelming, the court granted a new trial.
56
In Virginia, in Jackson v. Commonwealth,57 where the defen-
dant was charged with the armed robbery of a store clerk, the
Commonwealth's attorney's reasons for peremptorily striking prospec-
tive jurors were not specific enough to meet a Batson challenge.58 In
response to the defendant's Batson challenge, the Commonwealth's
attorney stated that race had nothing to do with his strikes, that he was
concerned about the jurors' addresses and that one juror "looked to be
about the same age as the defendant." 59 The court of appeals found these
reasons insufficient under Batson because they did not include an
explanation of why these facts were significant to the case. 60 Further-
more, the court noted that the Commonwealth's attorney did not question
any of the empaneled jurors as to their ages or addresses.61 Finally, the
court noted that the trial court erred in accepting the Commonwealth's
attorney's reasons at face value when they demanded further inquiry.
62
Like the District Court above, the court of appeals remanded the case for
a new trial with a properly selected jury.
63
The common denominator between Cunningham and Jackson
is not that the prosecution failed to give a correct reason for exercising
peremptory strikes so much as it failed to give any reason. The Batson
case requires very little of the prosecution in terms of what its reasoning
must be. However, Batson does require that the reasons be, at least,
significant to the case.64 The prosecution in the two cases above, failed
to articulate a reason related to the case.
II. Batson in Four of the Six States Which
Use the Death Penalty Most Frequently
The six states which use the death penalty most frequently, in
order from most frequent to least frequent, are as follows: Texas, Florida,
Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia and Alabama.65 The treatment Batson has
received in four of these states is reviewed below.
A. Georgia
In Georgia, the judge's inquiry into the basis for the
prosecution's reasons for exercising peremptory strikes is more thor-
ough than is apparent from judges in Virginia and the Fourth Circuit. In
a capital murder case, the Georgia Supreme Court noted in reversing and
remanding for a new trial, that the prosecution's reasons must be
evaluated in light of the explanations it has given for its otherperemptory
strikes and in light of thejurors it did not strike.66 The court did not accept
the prosecution's reason that a prospective juror was the same age as the
defendant when most of the empaneled jurors were approximately the
same age as the defendant. 67 Furthermore, the court did not accept the
prosecution's reason that ajuror was of low intelligence when the record
of the juror's answers to the prosecution's voir dire did not reveal a lack
of intelligence. 68 Also, the prosecution allowed two white jurors on the
panel who described themselves as "a little slow" and illiterate, respec-
tively. 69 Finally, the court could not accept the prosecution's reason that
ajuror had friends with drug/alcohol problems when several of the white
empaneled jurors stated that they had friends with drug/alcohol prob-
lems.70
B. Florida
Like the Georgia Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court
inquires thoroughly into any reason given by the prosecution to rebut a
Batson challenge. In State v. Slappy,71 the Florida Supreme Court has
held that a judge cannot accept the prosecution's reasons at face value,
but must weigh them as he would a disputed fact.72 In Slappy, the
prosecution offered "liberalism" as a reason for peremptorily striking
prospective jurors without having questioned them.73 In holding that the
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prosecution could not have established any sufficient reason under
Batson for striking the jurors without questioning them, the court
outlined five factors which tend to show that the prosecution's reasons
have no basis in the record: 1) alleged group bias not shown in the juror
in question; 2) failure to examine the juror where neither the defendant
nor the judge has questioned the juror; 3) singling out a juror for
questioning designed to evoke a certain response; 4) prosecution's
reason is unrelated to the facts; 5) challenge is based on reason applicable
to another juror who was not challenged. 74 Finally, the court noted that
its analysis recognized Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson in
which the justice argued that a prosecution may be biased even though
it believes otherwise. That is, the prosecution may take a black juror to
be sullen or inattentive when the same conduct by a whitejuror would not
evoke such a reaction.
75
C. Alabama
While not quite as demanding of its judges to inquire as to the
prosecution's bases for its reasons, Alabama does not allow many of the
reasons which are acceptable in Virginia and the Fourth Circuit in response
to aBatson challenge. AnAlabamacourtrefused severaloftheprosecution's
reasons which are acceptable in Virginia courts: that the juror lived in a
high crime area, a poor demeanor during voir dire and inattention to the
point that thejuror fell asleep.76 Also, that thejuror had a negative attitude,
was the same age as the defendant and had the same name as the defendant
were insufficient reasons in Alabama which would be acceptable in
Virginia.77 However, an Alabama court moved closer to the Virginia
standard by holding that a juror's attention to defense counsel and
corresponding inattention to the prosecution was a sufficient reason to
peremptorily strike that juror in the face of a Batson challenge.
78
D. Texas
In Texas, the courts' position on which reasons offered by the
prosecution in response to a Batson challenge is more like the courts'
position in Virginia than in Florida or Georgia.79 Also like Virginia, the
prosecution must show how a given reason relates to the case. For
instance, membership in a political group for the advancement of the
rights of black persons is not a sufficient reason on its face.80 Finally,
while, as in Virginia, many reasons are acceptable under Batson, using
race as a consideration is not.81
III. Recent United States Supreme Court Guidance:
Hernandez v. New York and the Future of Batson
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the extent of its
deference to the trial court's determination on Batson challenges. In
Hernandez v. New York,82 the United States Supreme Court upheld a trial
court's determination that the defendant failed to prove a Batson claim.
Here, the prosecutor was concerned with whether or not certain bilingual
jurors would accept the official record English translation of spanish
speaking witnesses through the interpreter or would listen to the testi-
mony in Spanish. The prosecutor peremptorily struck two prospective
jurors who he felt "from their hesitancy in their answers and their lack of
eye contact that they would not be able" to "accept what the interpreter
said as the final thing on what the record would be."'83 Since the
prosecutor volunteered his reasons for excluding those two jurors, the
defendant did not need to prove a prima facie case. Thus, Hernandez
addresses the second step of the Batson test in determining whether the
prosecutor's proffered reasons were race-neutral.
In regard to the prosecutor's facially race-neutral explanation,
the Court stated,
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis
here means an explanation based on something
other than the race of the juror. At this step of the
inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral.
84
In this case, the explanation of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
were based "neither on the intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors,
nor on stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals.
' '85
However, the Court stated that although a prosecutor may offer
a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge, "an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact, it is true, that the [classification] bears
more heavily on one race than another. '86 It is important that the Court
stated, "disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor's actions
into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause" because the
government actor must have "adopted the criterion with the intent of
causing the impact asserted. '87 But, the trial judge may consider
"disproportionate exclusion of members of a particular race . . . as
evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for
racial discrimination. '88 In view of the facts that the complainants and
witnesses were Latinos, that the prosecutor volunteered his reasons for
peremptory challenges, and that he could not testify as to which peremp-
torily struck jurors were Latinos, the Court upheld the trial court's
determination that the prosecutor's explanations were race-neutral and
not a pretext for discrimination. The Court stated, "we decline to
overturn the state trial court's finding on the issue of discriminatory
intent unless convinced that its determination was clearly erroneous." 89
The Court did state, "In holding that a race-neutral reason for
a peremptory challenge means a reason other than race, we do not resolve
the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race
should be defined for equal protection purposes .... It may well be, for
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a
particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for
race under an equal protection analysis." 90 In conclusion, the Court
reaffirmed its hesitancy to overturn a trial court's application of the
Batson test unless clearly erroneous but admitted that, under some
circumstances, some facially race-neutral explanations are a pretext for
race-based peremptory challenges. The Court also recognized that the
"disparate impact" of a criterion offered forperemptory challenges could
be circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.91
Conclusion
At the trial court level, defense counsel should seek to show in
the context of the totality of the facts that the prosecutor's race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge is a pretext or, more specifically,
that the prosecutor's proffered reason is really a "surrogate for race." In
addition, under Powers v. Ohio, membership in the race of excluded
jurors by the defendant is not a prerequisite to standing. Therefore,
whenever a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to strike potential
jurors of a particular race, defense counsel should object and seek to
determine whether these challenges were based on race. This is espe-
cially important if the case has any racial overtones or issues.
Although Batson applies to all cases, it may have special
significance for death penalty cases. The Supreme Court has recognized
that some capital murder defendants have been the victims of racial
discrimination. 92 When the prosecution states its reasons for perempto-
rily striking the jurors in question, defense counsel must confirm that the
prosecution's stated reason comports with its practice regarding other
prospectivejury members. It must be remembered that the prosecution's
reason for exercising a peremptory strike may be insufficient under
Batson, if the prosecution failed to strike other jurors for the same
reason. 93 Defense counsel should recognize when the prosecution's
stated reason for a peremptory strike appears to apply only to the struck
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juror.94 Remaining alert to possible Batson violations arising from the
prosecution's questioning during jury selection is essential to making a
successful Batson challenge. For a checklist of practices which could
signal a Batson violation, see the factors outlined above in State 1.
Slappy.95
Although the previously cited appellate opinions seem to
suggest that Batson challenges are rarely upheld, defense counsel should
not be discouraged from raising the claim. The appellate opinions do not
mention the trial courts, which may be upholding Batson challenges.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez noted that
some facially race-neutral explanations are a pretext for race-based
peremptory challenges in certain contexts. Finally, making a Batson
challenge can provide a tactical advantage in that it stops the trial and puts
the Commonwealth on the defensive by forcing it to reveal its motives for
peremptory challenges. At a minimum, something may be learned about
the Commonwealth's approach to the upcoming trial. At best, an
unresolved appellate issue will be created. For these, and many other
reasons, Batson challenges are worth making.
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